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Response from the author
I am grateful to all participants of this symposium for their 
thoughtful and generous commentaries. The strange truth 
about book-writing, which I suppose all experienced hands 
know (and I discovered as a first-time author), is the void 
that follows once the manuscript is finished. The book then 
disappears into the publishing process, and gradually snakes 
on to the desks and reading lists of other scholars. The 
author might wait months to find out what others make of it. 
One does, of course, obtain feedback via talks and 
presentations, but written responses based on detailed 
readings represent another degree of engagement; and to 
receive this rich collection is a huge pleasure. Warm thanks 

then to James Crawford, Jasper Finke, Jan Klabbers and Lea 
Wisken for their contributions, and to the editors of the 
Völkerrechtsblog, especially Valentin Jeutner, for organising 
the whole.
Before turning to the individual responses, I want to flag a 
common theme. The comments all rightly note that although 
strategically created treaty conflicts are described as the 
object of study, the underlying object of the book is to 
examine the relationship between international law and 
politics. The book, and the dissertation that formed its basis, 
emerged from my curiosity, even anxiety, about that 
relationship. I wanted to explore whether international law 
shapes politics, or is merely contingent upon state power 
and interest. Generations of international lawyers grappled 
with various versions of this question (as Finke notes). 
Presently (it seems to me) its poles are well-represented by 
two theses: first, that international law is simply an 
epiphenomenon, formally well-defined but irrelevant to the 
decision-making of powerful states; and second, that 
international law is a powerful, even constraining language, 
but, being no longer bound to form, susceptible to co-
option. The book takes these theses as its starting point and, 
as Crawford notes (quoting Safrin), uses strategically created 
treaty conflicts as a ‘Petri dish’ in which to examine the 
dance of law and politics.
The question that follows – and that the responses touch 
upon – is whether my use of such conflicts is too 
instrumental. Do I skate too lightly over the definition of 
treaty conflict (Wisken); are my three case-studies 
genuinely, or even mainly, treaty conflicts (Klabbers); and 
how are treaty conflicts to be solved (Finke)?
Generously, the commentaries give me a pass on these 
questions, noting that I do engage with them, or ignore them 
for good reason. But raising these points is not only right, it 
is also astute. In writing the book, I was conscious that my 
decision to use strategically created treaty conflicts as 
context for an inquiry into the politics of international law 
presented challenges as well as benefits. The challenge was 
precisely the danger of treating such conflicts as a plot 
McGuffin, using them to carry forward the narrative, but not 
engaging with them on their own terms. Although I was 
careful to think about the book as offering dual analyses, of 
treaty conflicts and of the politics of international law, the 
very benefit that the former afforded as the context for the 
latter required giving up on some ideas – of formal definition 
and solution – so as to focus on how arguments that there 
was (or not) a legal impasse were constructed and broken 
down in practice.
Now, to the specific contributions. I am grateful to James 
Crawford for guiding the dissertation and the book 
manuscript, and of explaining its arguments so succinctly 
here. I found it very difficult to present my book in a 
similarly concise way, distilling its contributions while 
preserving nuances.
James offers perceptive insights into the choices made by 
the book: to single out one point, he rightly notes that it 
does not seek to prove or disprove constructivist 
assumptions about law’s influence. Although I find 
constructivist theory interesting, I did not think I had the 
data or the methodological tools to state with certainty that 
what we saw in the three cases of treaty conflict was some 
form of state socialization at work. I presented material 
which may support that inference, but my interest remained 
in identifying strands of constructivist thinking within 
mainstream legal scholarship; and in exploring how in 
particular contexts, some constraints followed as a 
consequence of invoking legal norms and practices (without 
going into whether this signified their internalization by 
political elites).
Jasper Finke offers several pertinent observations in his 
contribution. I will comment on three. First, the promise of 
formalism. Jasper correctly equates formalism to a kind of 
idealism: that ‘law is impartial, impersonal and consistent in 
its application’, it protects from the excesses of politics, and 
thus promotes ‘a better and just world.’ He is also right that 
this view of the law’s promise underlies the faith in 
formalism that many international lawyers share (there are 
few amongst us who do not feel the pull of a culture of 
formalism, at least sometimes). But, is not the approach he 
describes conditioned upon a degree of satisfaction with the 
content of the law, which permits suspension of inquiry into 
the politics already embedded in it? Where the substance 
itself is not just, an impartial, impersonal and consistent 
application might – to take Fuller’s approach – prevent the 
worst excesses, but it cannot entail just outcomes. This is 
not a new point, so I will not belabour it. Just briefly: where 
formalism does not satisfy, it is not because politics in the 
‘real world’ does not allow it to flourish, but because it is a 
vehicle for some politics at the cost of others.
Jasper’s second point is related. He asks whether my 
‘categorization of the existing literature – formalist, 
functionalist, and constructivist mainstream versus neo-
realists and those committed to the idea of law as discourse’ 
is ‘too schematic.’ I concede to (perhaps inevitable) 
schematization in using specific works as my starting point: 
juxtaposing Goldsmith & Posner against Kennedy, for 
example. But I hope that the chapters on legal thought show 
that these categories break down when applied. The 
mainstream scholar, as I describe her, moves between 
formalism and functionalism. She accepts the idea of law as 
discourse and supports it because she further espouses 
liberal and constructivist assumptions of the promise of law. 
Taking this view, I do not inquire how these approaches 
individually address treaty conflicts.
Further, I agree with Jasper’s reading of elements of 
formalism in my work, to the extent that it makes a 
distinction between treaty modification and interpretation 
within the limits of a specific treaty regime. Of course, every 
act of interpretation produces a change, but we know – are 
taught to recognise – the difference between ‘plausible’ and 
(for the want of a better word) ‘creative’ interpretations that 
stretch the meaning of a treaty, and depend upon additional 
factors. A strategically created treaty conflict may provide 
such an additional factor. I thus support Jasper’s observation 
that ‘strategically created treaty conflicts do not necessarily 
illustrate how political influence destroys the otherwise 
orderly functioning of law, but rather exemplify that the 
struggle over the meaning of law is part of law itself.’ My aim 
was to show some of the texture of that struggle.
I owe much gratitude to Jan Klabbers. His book Treaty 
Conflicts and the European Union, published in early 2009, 
soon after I began my doctoral research, was a major 
influence on my dissertation, and thereafter on my book. His 
contribution offers an extremely perceptive identification of 
its themes – both overt and subliminal. I find his 
characterisation of the book’s approach, as theoretically- or 
critically-informed doctrinal work, helpful; I am encouraged 
that he considers it to offer an alternative to international 
relations approaches or social theory (although I do, of 
course, acknowledge being influenced by elements of both).
Jan’s observations that power and politics should not be 
constructed monolithically, that the hero of one context may 
be the villain of another, and that law and politics combine in 
various ways to promote good, bad, and ugly outcomes are 
helpful points of reference for my current research, which 
examines the emergence of various – tragic and techno-
utopian — imaginaries of the global commons, and 
particularly the deep seabed.
To take up one particular point from his contribution: the 
characterization of the three case studies as treaty conflicts. 
It is true that such characterization is a political act and (to 
some extent) a matter of perception. Other frames are 
indeed possible and sometimes plausible. The three 
examples, relating to the law of the sea, the International 
Criminal Court, and nuclear governance, may be viewed 
through prisms other than that of treaty conflict. The book 
concedes this in setting out its case for treating the three 
situations as treaty conflicts. The explanation in each 
instance is three-pronged: the characterization as treaty 
conflict is defensible; it is appropriate to the purposes of the 
book; and it is dictated by the fact that the relevant parties 
in each situation also seemed to embrace it (either saying as 
much, or implying it in their vehement denials). The third 
prong is the most important, for it was the parties’ 
presentation/perception of a conflict of legalities that set 
off the dynamics that I describe for each situation.
Lea Wisken raises a related point. She asks why I do not offer 
a definition of treaty conflict, having criticized both strict 
and liberal definitions. Like Jan, she generously goes on to 
answer the question, noting my suggestion that a conflict 
may be less a matter of definition, than perception and 
representation in practice. I would only add that of the two 
available definitions – strict and liberal – I am more 
comfortable with the latter, which is also the one espoused 
by the International Law Commission’s Fragmentation study. 
As I recall, the ILC takes a view of treaty conflict that 
extends to situations where one treaty challenges the 
effective operation of another.
Lea, finally, refers to another methodological choice of the 
book. The book does not fully place the three conflicts 
within a comparative framework. Lea notes that a 
comparison could help isolate the precise impact of legal 
discourses on the treaty conflicts. In particular, I could have 
compared outcomes of treaty conflicts with and without 
strong legal discourses, or shown that only a legal discourses 
can explain an otherwise puzzling outcome. My omission to 
take this approach, coupled with the fact that all three cases 
show strong legal discourses and that the outcome in each 
can be described as the successful challenge of a 
multinational regime by a coalition of powerful states, could 
merely confirm the predictions of the ‘hard-core realist 
International Relations scholar denying any relevance to 
International Law and legal discourses’.
Well, yes, perhaps. Certainly, a comparative approach 
seeking to isolate the impact of legal discourse would be a 
plausible way of proceeding with such a study. But, in my 
case, it was a conscious decision not to take this approach. I 
have reservations about the extent to which such 
comparative studies can really answer questions about the 
precise impact of ‘law’ as opposed to other factors, and as 
also mentioned above, did not gather data for the purpose. I 
was more interested in showing (as Klabbers summarizes) 
that not only is the law intensely political, but also that the 
political is likewise intensely legal. Thus, I focus on the 
particular practices by which legality is invoked and made to 
do the work of politics, as well as the systemic ‘baggage’ that 
comes with the choice of using law, making certain moves 
and claims more plausible than others. I hope that the 
picture offered is ultimately more complicated than the 
simple subversion of multilateral regimes to the interests of 
powerful states.
Of course, none of this excludes the possibility (dominant for 
the realists) that a powerful actor might achieve its ends in 
complete disregard of the law; the world we live in offers 
constant reminders of the fact. However, my book embraces 
the even more dangerous reality that, in bleakest examples 
of what we like to call ‘politics’, what we see is not so much 
the law’s subversion, as its utilization. The studies are 
offered in order to illuminate how, in which ways, and 
subject to what limits this can happen.
This post is rather longer than I had intended, and that is a 
testament to how much I enjoyed reading these 
contributions, and thinking through them. They provided me 
not just with commentaries on the book, but also questions 
and methodological choices that I will continue to reflect on 
in my research. And so, I want to end by once again thanking 
all the contributors for their terrific responses. I hope to 
remain in conversation even post this symposium.
Surabhi Ranganthan is a University Lecturer in International 
Law at the University of Cambridge and a Fellow of King’s 
College, Cambridge.
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